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1 Popper’s Contributions to the Enlightenment Programme
By the Enlightenment Programme I mean the idea of the 18th century French Enlightenment
of learning from scientific progress how to go about making social progress towards world
enlightenment.
Three steps need to be got right to put the basic Enlightenment idea into practice correctly:
(i) The progress-achieving methods of science need to be correctly identified.
(ii) These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they become fruitfully applicable to
any worthwhile, problematic human endeavour, whatever the aims may be, and not just
applicable to the endeavour of improving knowledge.
(iii) The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then need to be exploited correctly by
the great human endeavour of trying to make social progress towards an enlightened, civilized
world.
Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got all three points disastrously wrong.
They failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods of natural science (in that they
defended inductivist, or at least verificationist, conceptions of science); they failed to generalize
these methods properly; and, most disastrously of all, they failed to apply them properly so that
humanity might learn how to become more civilized or enlightened by rational means. Instead
of applying the generalized progress-achieving methods of science to social life itself, so that
social progress might be achieved, the philosophes sought to apply scientific method merely to
social science. Reason (as construed by the philosophes) got applied, not to the task of making
social progress towards an enlightened world, but to the task of making intellectual progress
towards greater knowledge about the social world. Social inquiry was developed, not as social
methodology or social philosophy, but as social science.
This traditional but botched version of the Enlightenment Programme was immensely
influential. It was developed throughout the 19
th century by Comte, Marx, Mill and many others,
and was built into the institutional structure of academic inquiry in the 20
th century with the
creation of departments of social science: anthropology, economics, psychology, sociology,
linguistics, political science. Academic inquiry as it exists today, devoted primarily to the
pursuit of knowledge, is the outcome.
Much of the importance of Karl Popper’s work, especially of his first four books, stems from
the fact that it does much to correct defects of the traditional, bungled Enlightenment Programme
that we have inherited from the 18
th century – although Popper does not himself formulate his
contribution in these terms. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper goes some way towards
correcting step (i) above. Science does not, and cannot, verify its theories. Science makes
progress by proposing bold conjectures in response to problems, which are then subjected to
sustained attempted empirical refutation. This falsificationist conception of scientific method is
then generalized, in accordance with step (ii) above, to form Popper's conception of (critical)
rationality, a general methodology for solving problems or making progress. As Popper puts it in
The Logic of Scientific Discovery "inter-subjective testing is merely a very important aspect of
the more general idea of inter-subjective criticism, or in other words, of the idea of mutual2
rational control by critical discussion" (Popper, 1959, 44, n *1: see also Popper, 1963, 193-200;
1972, 119 & 243).
In The Open Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism Popper applies critical
rationalism to problems of civilization, in accordance with step (iii) above. From all the riches
of these two books, I pick just two points, two corrections Popper makes to ideas inherited from
the Enlightenment.
First, there is Popper’s devastating criticism of historicism. Pro-naturalistic historicism is the
outcome of an especially defective attempt to put step (iii) of the Enlightenment Programme into
practice. If one seeks to develop social science alongside natural science, and if one takes the
capacity of Newtonian science to predict states of the solar system far into the future as a
paradigmatic achievement of natural science, one may be misled into holding that the proper task
of social science is to discover laws governing social evolution. Historicism is the doctrine that
such laws exist. Popper decisively demolishes historicism, and demolishes the above rationale
for adopting historicism. In doing so, he demolishes one influential and especially defective
version of the traditional Enlightenment Programme.
Second, Popper’s revolutionary contributions to steps (i) and (ii) of the Enlightenment
Programme lead to a new idea as to what a “rational society” might be, one that is fully in
accordance with liberal traditions, and not entirely at odds with such traditions. A major
objection to the Enlightenment programme is overcome. If one upholds pre-Popperian
conceptions of science and reason, and construes reason, in particular, as a set of rules which
determine what one must accept or do, the very idea of “the rational society” is abhorrent. It can
amount to little more than a tyranny of reason, a society in which spontaneity and freedom are
crushed by the requirement that the rules of reason be obeyed. When viewed from the
perspective of Popper’s falsificationism and critical rationalism, however, all this changes
dramatically.
Popper’s falsificationist conception of science requires that theories are severely tested
empirically. But, in order to make sense of this idea of severe testing, we need to see the
experimentalist as having at least the germ of an idea for a rival theory up his sleeve (otherwise
testing might degenerate into performing essentially the same experiment again and again). This
means experiments are always crucial experiments, attempts at trying to decide between two
competing theories. Theoretical pluralism is necessary for science to be genuinely empirical.
And, more generally (implementing step (ii)), in order to criticize an idea, one needs to have a
rival idea in mind. Rationality, as construed by Popper, requires plurality of ideas, values, ways
of life. Thus, for Popper, the rational society is the open society, the society in which diverse
ways of life can flourish. In short, given pre-Popperian conceptions of science and reason, the
Enlightenment idea of creating a rational society guides one towards a kind of tyranny of reason,
the very opposite of a free or open society. Adopt improved Popperian conceptions of science
and reason, and the Enlightenment ideal of the rational society is one and the same as the ideal of
the free, open society. At a stroke, a major objection to the Enlightenment Programme is
overcome.
Despite the enormous improvements that Popper has made to the traditional Enlightenment
Programme, his version of the Programme is still defective. I now discuss two ways in which
Popper’s version of the Programme needs to be improved. Both involve changing dramatically
Popper’s conception of social science. It is important to note that Popper defends a highly
traditional conception of social science. According to him, the methods of social science are
broadly the same as those of natural science (Popper, 1961, 61-63). But it is this key element of3
the 18
thcentury Enlightenment, so profoundly influential over subsequent developments, that
constitutes the traditional Enlightenment’s greatest blunder. Popper endorses, and fails to
correct, this blunder.
2 The New Enlightenment, First Version
Let us, then, consider again the basic Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific progress
how to go about making social progress towards an enlightened world. And let us consider what
form academic inquiry ought to take granted that it has, as a basic aim, to help promote human
welfare, help humanity learn how to become more enlightened or civilized, and granted, too, that
it seeks to implement the three steps of the Enlightenment Programme, (i) to (iii), with which we
began.
As a minor improvement to Popper’s critical rationalism, I suggest we take the following as
basic “rules of reason”, arrived at by generalizing the methods of science (in accordance with
step (ii)):-
1. Articulate, and try to improve the articulation of, the problem to be solved.
2. Propose and critically assess possible solutions.
3. When necessary, break up the basic problem to be solved into a number of preliminary,
simpler, analogous, subordinate or specialized problems (to be tackled in accordance with rules 1
and 2), in an attempt to work gradually towards a solution to the basic problem to be solved.
4. Interconnect attempts to solve basic and specialized problems, so that basic problem-solving
may guide, and be guided by, specialized problem-solving (see Maxwell, 1980, 20-21; 1984, 67-
75).
Popper's critical rationalism consists of rules 1 and 2; problem-solving rationality (as 1 to 4
may be called) improves on this by adding on rules 3 and 4, which become relevant when we are
confronted by some especially recalcitrant problem - such as the problem of understanding the
nature of the universe, or the problem of creating a civilized world - which can only be solved
gradually and progressively, bit by bit, and not all at once. Popper was too hostile to
specialization to emphasize the need for rule 3; he did not appreciate that the evils of
specialization can be counteracted by implementing rule 4.
Two preliminary points now need to be made.
First, in order to create a more civilized, enlightened world, the problems that we need to
solve are, fundamentally, problems of living rather than problems of knowledge. It is what we do
(or refrain from doing) that matters, and not just what we know. Even where new knowledge or
technology is needed, in connection with agriculture or medicine for example, it is always what
this enables us to do that solves the problem of living.
Second, in order to make progress towards a sustainable, civilized world we need to learn
how to resolve our conflicts in more cooperative ways than at present. A group acts
cooperatively in so far as all members of the group share responsibility for what is done, and for
deciding what is done, proposals for action, for resolution of problems and conflicts, being
judged on their merits from the standpoint of the interests of the members of the group (or the
group as a whole), there being no permanent leadership or delegation of power. Competition is
not opposed to cooperation if it proceeds within a framework of cooperation, as it does ideally
within science. There are of course degrees of cooperativeness, from its absence, all out
violence, at one extreme, to settling of conflicts by means of threat, to agreed procedures such as
voting, to bargaining, to all out cooperativeness at the other extreme. If we are to develop a
sustainable, civilized world we need to move progressively away from the violent end of this4
spectrum towards the cooperative end.
Granted, then, that the task of academic inquiry is to put the four rules of problem-solving
rationality into practice in such a way as to help humanity learn how to make progress towards a
civilized, enlightened world, the primary intellectual tasks must be:
1. To articulate, and try to improve the articulation of, those social problems of living we need to
solve in order to make progress towards a better world.
2. To propose and critically assess possible, and actual, increasingly cooperative social actions -
these actions to be assessed for their capacity to resolve human problems and conflicts, thus
enhancing the quality of human life.
These intellectually fundamental tasks are undertaken by social inquiry, at the heart of the
academic enterprise. Social inquiry also has the task of promoting increasingly cooperatively
rational tackling of problems of living in the social world - in such contexts as politics,
commerce, international affairs, industry, agriculture, the media, the law, education.
Academic inquiry also needs, of course, to implement the third rule of rational problem
solving; that is, it needs:
3. To break up the basic problems of living into preliminary, simpler, analogous, subordinate,
specialized problems of knowledge and technology, in an attempt to work gradually towards
solutions to the basic problems of living.
But, in order to ensure that specialized and basic problem solving keep in contact with one
another, the fourth rule of rational problem solving also needs to be implemented; that is,
academic inquiry needs:
4. To interconnect attempts to solve basic and specialized problems, so that basic problem-
solving may guide, and be guided by, specialized problem-solving.
There are a number of points to note about this "rational problem solving" conception of
academic inquiry. Social inquiry is not, primarily, social science; it has, rather, the intellectually
basic task of engaging in, and promoting in the social world, increasingly cooperatively rational
tackling of conflicts and problems of living (see Maxwell, 1984, 162-166 for further details).
Social inquiry, so conceived, is actually intellectually more fundamental than natural science
(which seeks to solve subordinate problems of knowledge and understanding). Academic
inquiry, in seeking to promote cooperatively rational problem solving in the social world, must
engage in a two-way exchange of ideas, arguments, experiences and information with the social
world. The thinking, the problem solving, that really matters, that is really fundamental, is the
thinking that we engage in, individually, socially and institutionally, as we live; the whole of
academic inquiry is, in a sense, a specialized part of this, created in accordance with rule 3, but
also being required to implement rule 4 (so that social and academic problem solving may
influence each other). Academic inquiry, on this model, is a kind of peoples' civil service, doing
openly for the public what actual civil services are supposed to do, in secret, for governments.
Academic inquiry needs just sufficient power to retain its independence, to resist pressures from
government, industry, the media, religious authorities, and public opinion, but no more.
Academia proposes to, argues with, learns from, attempts to teach, and criticizes all sectors of
the social world, but does not instruct or dictate. It is an intellectual resource for the public, not
an intellectual bully.
The basic intellectual aim of inquiry may be said to be, not knowledge, but wisdom - wisdom
being understood to be the desire, the active endeavour and the capacity to realize what is
desirable and of value in life, for oneself and others (“realize” meaning both "to apprehend" and
"to make real"). Wisdom includes knowledge, know-how and understanding but goes beyond5
them in also including the desire and active striving for what is of value, the ability to experience
value, actually and potentially, in the circumstances of life, the capacity to help realize what is of
value for oneself and others, the capacity to help solve those problems of living that need to be
solved if what is of value is to be realized, the capacity to use and develop knowledge,
technology and understanding as needed for the realization of value. Wisdom, like knowledge,
can be conceived of not only in personal terms but also in institutional or social terms. Thus, the
basic aim of academic inquiry, according to the view being indicated here, is to help us develop
wiser ways of living, wiser institutions, customs and social relations, a wiser world.
It is important to appreciate that the conception of academic inquiry that we are considering is
designed to help us to see, to know and to understand, for their own sake, just as much as it is
designed to help us solve practical problems of living. It might seem that social inquiry, in
articulating problems of living and proposing possible solutions, has only a severely practical
purpose. But engaging in this intellectual activity of articulating personal and social problems of
living is just what we need to do if we are to develop a good empathic or "personalistic"
understanding of our fellow human beings (and of ourselves) - a kind of understanding that can
do justice to our humanity, to what is of value, potentially and actually, in our lives. In order to
understand another person as a person (as opposed to a biological or physical system) I need to
be able, in imagination, to see, desire, fear, believe, experience and suffer what the other person
sees, desires, etc. I need to be able, in imagination, to enter into the other person's world; that is,
I need to be able to understand his problems of living as he understands them, and I need also,
perhaps, to understand a more objective version of these problems. In giving intellectual priority
to the tasks of articulating problems of living and exploring possible solutions, social inquiry
thereby gives intellectual priority to the development of a kind of understanding that people can
acquire of one another that is of great intrinsic value. In my view, indeed, personalistic
understanding is essential to the development of our humanity, even to the development of
consciousness. Our being able to understand each other in this way is also essential for
cooperatively rational action.
And it is essential for science. It is only because scientists can enter imaginatively into one
another's problems and research projects that objective scientific knowledge can develop. At
least two rather different motives exist for trying to see the world as another sees it: one may
seek to improve one’s knowledge of the other person; or one may seek to improve one’s
knowledge of the world, it being possible that the other person has something to contribute to
one's own knowledge. Scientific knowledge arises as a result of the latter use of personalistic
understanding - scientific knowledge being, in part, the product of endless acts of personalistic
understanding between scientists (with the personalistic element largely suppressed so that it
becomes invisible). It is hardly too much to say that almost all that is of value in human life is
based on personalistic understanding. (For further details see Maxwell, 1984, 172-89 and 264-
75; 2001, chs. 5-7).
The basic intellectual aim of the kind of inquiry we are considering is to devote reason to the
discovery of what is of value in life. This immediately carries with it the consequence that the
arts have a vital rational contribution to make to inquiry, as revelations of value, as imaginative
explorations of possibilities, desirable or disastrous, or as vehicles for the criticism of fraudulent
values through comedy, satire or tragedy. Literature and drama also have a rational role to play
in enhancing our ability to understand others personalistically, as a result of identifying
imaginatively with fictional characters - literature in this respect merging into biography,
documentary and history. Literary criticism bridges the gap between literature and social6
inquiry, and is more concerned with the content of literature than the means by which it achieves
its effects.
Another important consequence flows from the point that the basic aim of inquiry is to help
us discover what is of value, namely that our feelings and desires have a vital rational role to
play within the intellectual domain of inquiry. If we are to discover for ourselves what is of
value, then we must attend to our feelings and desires. But not everything that feels good is
good, and not everything that we desire is desirable. Rationality requires that feelings and
desires take fact, knowledge and logic into account, just as it requires that priorities for scientific
research take feelings and desires into account. In insisting on this kind of interplay between
feelings and desires on the one hand, knowledge and understanding on the other, the conception
of inquiry that we are considering resolves the conflict between rationalism and romanticism,
and helps us to acquire what we need if we are to contribute to building civilization: mindful
hearts and heartfelt minds.
All this differs dramatically from academic inquiry as it mostly exists at present, devoted
primarily to the pursuit of knowledge. And it differs from Popper’s conceptions of social
inquiry, and academic inquiry more generally. It deserves to be noted that, when judged from the
standpoint of promoting human welfare, a kind of inquiry that gives priority to the pursuit of
knowledge violates three of the above four rules of reason. Rules 1 and 2 are violated because
the intellectual activities of articulating problems of living, proposing and criticizing possible
solutions, cannot proceed within the context of the pursuit of knowledge. And once rules 1 and
2 are not implemented, rule 4 cannot be either.
3 The New Enlightenment, Second Version
I come now to a rather more radical revision of Popper's version of the Enlightenment
Programme. This begins with a revision of step (i) of the Programme. Popper's falsificationism
is untenable, and needs to be replaced by a conception of scientific method which I have called
aim-oriented empiricism (AOE). The reason for this revision can be summarized as follows.
Physics only considers (and only accepts) theories that are sufficiently simple, unified or
explanatory, and this means that the methods of physics make a persistent metaphysical
assumption about the universe, to the effect that it has a simple, unified, explanatory dynamic
structure. That such a persistent metaphysical assumption is made by physics, as a part of
(conjectural) scientific knowledge, contradicts, and refutes, falsificationism. An improved
conception of scientific method is required.
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper claims that the more falsifiable a theory is, so the
greater its degree of simplicity. (There is a second method for assessing degrees of simplicity, in
terms of number of observation statements required to falsify the theories in question, but Popper
stresses that if the two methods clash, it is the first that takes precedence.) It is easy to see that
Popper's proposal fails. Given a reasonably simple scientific theory, T, one can readily increase
the falsifiability of T by adding on an independently testable hypotheses, h1, to form the new
theory, T + h1. This new theory will be more falsifiable than T but, in general, will be drastically
less simple. And one can make the situation even worse, by adding on as many independently
testable hypotheses as one pleases, h2, h3 and so on, to form new theories T + h1 + h2 + h3 + ..., as
highly empirically falsifiable and as drastically lacking in simplicity, as one pleases. Thus
simplicity cannot be equated with falsifiability.
And there is a further, even more devastating point. Popper's methodological rules favour
T + h1 + h2 + h3 over T, especially if h1, h2 and h3 have been severely tested, and corroborated.7
But in scientific practice, T + h1 + h2 + h3 would never even be considered, however highly
corroborated it might be if considered, because of its extreme lack of simplicity or unity, its
grossly ad hoc character. There is here a fundamental flaw in the central doctrine of The Logic
of Scientific Discovery.
Later, in Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Popper put forward a new methodological
principle which, when added to those of the earlier book, succeeds in excluding theories such as
T + h1 + h2 + h3 from scientific consideration. This principle states that a new theory, in order to
be acceptable, "should proceed from some simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea about some
connection or relation (such as gravitational attraction) between hitherto unconnected things
(such as planets and apples) or facts (such as inertial and gravitational mass) or new "theoretical
entities" (such as field and particles)" (Popper, 1963, 241). T + h1 + h2 + h3 does not "proceed
from some simple, new and powerful, unifying idea" and is to be rejected on that account, even if
more highly corroborated than T.
But the adoption of this "requirement of simplicity" (as Popper calls it) as a basic
methodological principle of science has the effect of permanently excluding from science all ad
hoc theories (such as T + h1 + h2 + h3) that fail to satisfy the principle, however empirically
successful such theories might be if considered. This amounts to assuming permanently that the
universe is such that no ad hoc theory, that fails to satisfy Popper's principle of simplicity, is
true. It amounts to accepting, as a permanent item of scientific knowledge, the substantial
metaphysical thesis that the universe is non-ad hoc, in the sense that no theory that fails to satisfy
Popper's principle of simplicity is true. But this clashes with Popper's criterion of demarcation:
that no unfalsifiable, metaphysical thesis is to be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge.
It is, in fact, important that Popper's criterion of demarcation is rejected, and the metaphysical
thesis of non-ad hocness is explicitly acknowledged to be a part of scientific knowledge. The
thesis, in the form in which it is implicitly adopted at any given stage in the development of
science, may well be false. Scientific progress may require that it be modified. The thesis needs
to be made explicit, in other words, for good Popperian reasons, namely, so that it can be
critically assessed, and perhaps improved. As long as Popper's demarcation criterion is upheld,
the metaphysical thesis must remain implicit within science, and hence immune to criticism.
As I have argued at length elsewhere (Maxwell, 1998; see also Maxwell, 1974; 1984, ch. 9;
1993, 1999; 2001; 2002b; 2004; 2005), in order to facilitate criticism and improvement of
metaphysical theses implicit in persistent scientific rejection of ad hoc, disunified physical
theories, we need to reject Popper’s falsificationism and adopt AOE instead, a view which
construes science as accepting, as a part of (conjectural) scientific knowledge, a hierarchy of
metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these
theses becoming increasingly insubstantial as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus becoming
increasingly likely to be true. At any level in this hierarchy of theses, that thesis is accepted
which either (a) is such that its truth is a necessary condition for the acquisition of knowledge to
be possible at all, or is such that (b) it is more nearly compatible with the best available thesis
immediately above in the hierarchy and (c) it appears to be more fruitful from the standpoint of
promoting the growth of empirical knowledge than any rival. Those physical theories are
accepted which (a) meet with sufficient empirical success, and (b) are sufficiently in accord with
the best available metaphysical thesis at the bottom of the hierarchy of theses. Associated with
each metaphysical thesis, M, there is a methodological principle which asserts: accept that thesis
or theory lower down in the hierarchy which best accords with M.
If there is a clash between a physical theory and experimental result, and the result has8
survived severe, sustained critical, experimental scrutiny, then the theory is, in general, held to
be false. But there is always the possibility that the fault lies, not with the theory, but with the
experimental result, and it is the latter that needs to be rejected. Likewise, given a dramatic clash
between theory and the best available metaphysical thesis at the bottom of the hierarchy of theses
then, in general, the theory will be rejected (whatever its empirical success might be) on the
grounds that it is too ad hoc and disunified to be accepted. It is always possible, however, that
the fault may lie with the metaphysical thesis rather than the physical theory; the theory may be
accepted, and the metaphysical thesis may be revised. This is likely to happen if the theory (a)
has met with great empirical success and (b) accords with that metaphysical thesis one up in the
hierarchy of theses. In this way, according to AOE, as physics proceeds, clashes between a
physical theory and the metaphysical thesis at the bottom of the hierarchy of theses in general
results in the theory being rejected, but will, on occasions, result in the metaphysical thesis being
revised and the theory being accepted. Examples of such revisions taken from the history of
physics are: rejection of the corpuscular hypothesis (which clashes with Newtonian theory);
rejection of the view that nature consists of point-atoms interacting by means of rigid,
spherically-symmetrical forces (which clashes with Maxwellian electrodynamics given its field
interpretation, and special relativity); rejection of the view that nature consists of a self-
interacting classical field (which clashes with quantum theory). Metaphysical theses higher up in
the hierarchy survive such revisions of theses at the bottom of the hierarchy. The basic idea of
this hierarchical view is to concentrate criticism and revision where it seems most likely to be
needed, namely low down in the hierarchy of theses. In this way, a relatively permanent,
unproblematic framework of assumptions and associated methods is created within which much
more specific, substantial and problematic assumptions and methods can be revised in the light
of the empirical success and failure of associated research programmes. As theoretical
knowledge improves, assumptions and associated methods improve as well: knowledge-about-
how-to-improve-knowledge is improved. There is something like positive feedback between
improving knowledge, and improving assumptions and methods, or aims and methods, the
methodological key, according to this view, to the immense success of modern science. (For
further details see Maxwell, 1998; see also 1974; 1984, ch. 9; 1993, 1999; 2001; 2002b; 2004;
2005.)
This hierarchical, aim-oriented empiricist conception of scientific method can be generalized,
in accordance with step (ii) of the Enlightenment Programme, to form a new conception of
rationality fruitfully applicable to any worthwhile human endeavour with problematic aims. As
we have in effect just seen, a basic and highly problematic aim of science is to discover in what
way (and to what extent) the universe is comprehensible, it being presupposed that it is
comprehensible in some way or another, to some extent. Precisely because of the highly
problematic character of this aim, we need to represent it as a hierarchy of aims, increasingly
unspecific and unproblematic as we go up the hierarchy, thus creating a relatively permanent
framework of unproblematic aims and associated methods within which more specific and
problematic aims and associated methods can be revised and, we may hope, improved, as we
proceed, in the light of empirical success and failure.
But it is not just in science that aims are problematic; this is the case in life too, either because
different aims conflict, or because what we believe to be desirable and realizable lacks one or
other of these features, or both. Above all, the aim of creating global civilization is inherently
and profoundly problematic. Quite generally, then, and not just in science, whenever we pursue
a problematic aim we need first, to acknowledge the aim; then we need to represent it as a9
hierarchy of aims, from the specific and problematic at the bottom of the hierarchy, to the
general and unproblematic at the top. In this way we provide ourselves with a framework within
which we may improve more or less specific and problematic aims and methods as we proceed,
learning from success and failure in practice what it is that is both of most value and realizable.
Such an "aim-oriented" conception of rationality is the proper generalization of the aim-oriented,
progress-achieving methods of science (see Maxwell, 1976; 1984, ch. 5; and 2001, ch. 9; 2004,
ch. 3).
Any conception of rationality which systematically leads us astray must be defective. But any
conception of rationality, such as Popper's critical rationalism, which does not include explicit
means for the improvement of aims, must systematically lead us astray. It will do so whenever
we fail to choose that aim that is in our best interests or, more seriously, whenever we
misrepresent our aim - as we are likely to do whenever aims are problematic. In these
circumstances, the more "rationally" we pursue the aim we acknowledge, the worse off we will
be. Systematically, such conceptions of rationality, which do not include provisions for
improving problematic aims, are a hindrance rather than a help; they are, in short, defective.
(Science specifically, and academia more generally, at present misrepresent basic aims: see
Maxwell, 1976; 1984; 2002a; 2004.)
AOE and its generalization, aim-oriented rationality (AOR), incorporate all the good points of
Popper's falsificationist conception of science and its generalization, critical rationalism,
indicated above, but also improve on Popper's notions, in being designed to help science and
other worthwhile endeavours progressively improve problematic aims and methods.
We come now to step (iii) of the new Enlightenment Programme. The task, here, is to help
humanity gradually get more AOR into diverse aspects of social and institutional life - personal,
political, economic, educational, international - so that humanity may gradually learn how to
make progress towards an enlightened world. Social inquiry, in taking up this task, needs to be
pursued as social methodology or social philosophy. What the philosophy of science is to
science, as conceived by AOE, so sociology is to the social world: it has the task of helping
diverse valuable human endeavours and institutions gradually improve aims and methods so that
the world may make social progress towards global enlightenment. (The sociology of science, as
a special case, is one and the same thing as the philosophy of science.) And a basic task of
academic inquiry, more generally, becomes to help humanity solve its problems of living in
increasingly rational, cooperative, enlightened ways, thus helping humanity become more
civilized. The basic aim of academic inquiry becomes, as I have already said, to promote the
growth of wisdom. Those parts of academic inquiry devoted to improving knowledge,
understanding and technological know-how contribute to the growth of wisdom. The New
Enlightenment Programme thus has dramatic and far reaching implications for academic inquiry,
for almost every branch and aspect of science and the humanities, for its overall character and
structure, its overall aims and methods, and its relationship to the rest of the social world. (For
further details see Maxwell, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1987, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1997, 1998, 2000a,
2000b, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, and especially 1984 and 2004.)
As I have already remarked, the aim of achieving global civilization is inherently problematic.
This means, according to AOR, that we need to represent the aim at a number of levels, from the
specific and highly problematic to the unspecific and unproblematic. Thus, at a fairly specific
level, we might, for example, specify civilization to be a state of affairs in which there is an end
to war, dictatorships, population growth, extreme inequalities of wealth, and the establishment of
democratic, liberal world government and a sustainable world industry and agriculture. At a10
rather more general level we might specify civilization to be a state of affairs in which everyone
shares equally in enjoying, sustaining and creating what is of value in life in so far as this is
possible. And at a more general level still, we might specify civilization to be that ideal,
realizable state of affairs we ought to try to achieve in the long term.
As a result of building into our institutions and social life such a hierarchical structure of aims
and associated methods, we create a framework within which it becomes possible for us
progressively to improve our real-life aims and methods in increasingly cooperative ways as we
live. Diverse philosophies of life - diverse religious, political, economic and moral views - may
be cooperatively developed, assessed and tested against the experience of personal and social
life. It becomes possible progressively to improve diverse philosophies of life (diverse views
about what is of value in life and how it is to be realized) much as theories are progressively and
cooperatively improved in science.
AOR is especially relevant when it comes to resolving conflicts cooperatively. If two groups
have partly conflicting aims but wish to discover the best resolution of the conflict, AOR helps
in requiring of those involved that they represent aims at a level of sufficient imprecision for
agreement to be possible, thus creating an agreed framework within which disagreements may be
explored and resolved. AOR cannot, of itself, combat non-cooperativeness, or induce a desire
for cooperativeness; it can however facilitate the cooperative resolution of conflicts if the desire
for this exists. In facilitating the cooperative resolution of conflicts in this way, AOR can, in the
long term, encourage the desire for cooperation to grow (if only because it encourages belief in
the possibility of cooperation).
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